Resumption of Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia
As President Bush concluded his South Asian trip and penned a nuclear deal with India, Pakistan’s President General Musharraf is keeping his 'strategic options open.' That is the chilling message sent recently by Pakistan to the world over President Bush’s blunt rejection to Pakistan’s request on similar deal.
The day before Bush flew to Islamabad in the dead of night, with his wing lights off and the window shades down, Musharraf delivered an address in his native Urdu to Pakistan's National Defense College. He had just returned from a trip to China, Pakistan's old cold-war arms supplier. He said, "America has signed a civil nuclear agreement with India on the basis of what it sees to be its interests. My recent trip to China was part of my effort to keep Pakistan's strategic options open."
What are these strategic options?
Pakistan’s nuclear program has long been known to be created with China’s help. China may not have technology as good as America’s, but it is not a junkyard either. As a friend, China will be much more reliable than America. This is not because of any character defect. But the fact that America is a democracy and therefore it is always vulnerable to democratic discourse. On the contrary, China is a dictatorship as Pakistan is.
Moreover, China will not be propelled by mere goodwill or friendship; its policy will hinge on pure self-interest, its national interests. And since a critical rationale for the Bush shift in South Asia is to help India become a counterweight to China, Beijing will respond swiftly by playing the Pakistan card against India.
China has already assured Pakistan three more nuclear reactors, and so far, there has not been any complain by Islamabad on fuel shortage problems, a clear contradiction to New Delhi’s continuous worry over its nuclear fuel supply.
What Musharraf gets from China could help determine whether President Bush's new diplomatic accord with India is a triumph or the trigger for a new era of nuclear proliferation.
History has witnessed that both India and Pakistan have been subject to U.S. sanctions since they tested nuclear weapons in the summer of 1998. But under the terms of the new deal, which was eight months in the making, India alone would be brought back from official outcast status. According to this deal, New Delhi agreed to subject 14 of its nuclear reactors to international inspection by 2014. But it reserves the right to produce unlimited fissile material, to keep its eight military reactors from any scrutiny and to build as many more as it wants.
In return India will receive U.S. investment and equipment directed toward expanding its civilian nuclear program.
The US decision to grant India a nuclear status is definitely against the backdrop of its efforts to curb nuclear rouge states and its fight against terrorism. By giving special treatment to New Delhi in the pretext of its flourishing democracy, a sterling record on non-proliferation and a future Indo – US strategic partnership to spread democracy and freedom to the world, it has threatened to blast a bomb-size loophole through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
It would have been bad enough on its own, and disastrously ill-timed. Because it undercuts some of the most powerful arguments Washington can make to try to galvanize international opposition to Iran's nuclear adventurism.
At the same time, by refusing Pakistan the same treatment on the pretext of its continuous evasion to democratic setup and sheltering terrorists in its territory only means jealousy and heart break.
As has been stated in the beginning, President Musharraf has said that Pakistan’s strategic options are open and China is ready to provide the necessary resources for Pakistan.
A concluding remark in an editorial in the New York Times clearly denotes that, “it would be an unthinkably bad idea [for the US] to grant a loophole to a country [Pakistan] whose top nuclear scientist helped transfer nuclear technology to leading rogue states. [But] granting India a loophole that damages a vital treaty [the NPT] and lets New Delhi accelerate production of nuclear bombs makes no sense either.”
Even though the ambitious Indo – US nuclear deal signed in New Delhi on 2 March 2006 still needs the ratification from the US Congress, it however has marked the resumption of nuclear arms race in South Asia.
By granting India a nuclear status while at the same time depriving its archrival Pakistan, a natural ally of the US, President Bush has not only done damage to the treaty (the NPT), as has been raised by China. But he is also losing the confidence of one of his most important allies against terrorists, Pakistan.
India and Pakistan are neighbors and military archrivals that have fought each other repeatedly. Kargil war was the last war the two neighbors have fought. They have both developed nuclear weapons outside the nonproliferation treaty, which both refuse to sign. The new deal will remain to be seen as Bush’s diplomatic triumph or a resumption of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
The day before Bush flew to Islamabad in the dead of night, with his wing lights off and the window shades down, Musharraf delivered an address in his native Urdu to Pakistan's National Defense College. He had just returned from a trip to China, Pakistan's old cold-war arms supplier. He said, "America has signed a civil nuclear agreement with India on the basis of what it sees to be its interests. My recent trip to China was part of my effort to keep Pakistan's strategic options open."
What are these strategic options?
Pakistan’s nuclear program has long been known to be created with China’s help. China may not have technology as good as America’s, but it is not a junkyard either. As a friend, China will be much more reliable than America. This is not because of any character defect. But the fact that America is a democracy and therefore it is always vulnerable to democratic discourse. On the contrary, China is a dictatorship as Pakistan is.
Moreover, China will not be propelled by mere goodwill or friendship; its policy will hinge on pure self-interest, its national interests. And since a critical rationale for the Bush shift in South Asia is to help India become a counterweight to China, Beijing will respond swiftly by playing the Pakistan card against India.
China has already assured Pakistan three more nuclear reactors, and so far, there has not been any complain by Islamabad on fuel shortage problems, a clear contradiction to New Delhi’s continuous worry over its nuclear fuel supply.
What Musharraf gets from China could help determine whether President Bush's new diplomatic accord with India is a triumph or the trigger for a new era of nuclear proliferation.
History has witnessed that both India and Pakistan have been subject to U.S. sanctions since they tested nuclear weapons in the summer of 1998. But under the terms of the new deal, which was eight months in the making, India alone would be brought back from official outcast status. According to this deal, New Delhi agreed to subject 14 of its nuclear reactors to international inspection by 2014. But it reserves the right to produce unlimited fissile material, to keep its eight military reactors from any scrutiny and to build as many more as it wants.
In return India will receive U.S. investment and equipment directed toward expanding its civilian nuclear program.
The US decision to grant India a nuclear status is definitely against the backdrop of its efforts to curb nuclear rouge states and its fight against terrorism. By giving special treatment to New Delhi in the pretext of its flourishing democracy, a sterling record on non-proliferation and a future Indo – US strategic partnership to spread democracy and freedom to the world, it has threatened to blast a bomb-size loophole through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
It would have been bad enough on its own, and disastrously ill-timed. Because it undercuts some of the most powerful arguments Washington can make to try to galvanize international opposition to Iran's nuclear adventurism.
At the same time, by refusing Pakistan the same treatment on the pretext of its continuous evasion to democratic setup and sheltering terrorists in its territory only means jealousy and heart break.
As has been stated in the beginning, President Musharraf has said that Pakistan’s strategic options are open and China is ready to provide the necessary resources for Pakistan.
A concluding remark in an editorial in the New York Times clearly denotes that, “it would be an unthinkably bad idea [for the US] to grant a loophole to a country [Pakistan] whose top nuclear scientist helped transfer nuclear technology to leading rogue states. [But] granting India a loophole that damages a vital treaty [the NPT] and lets New Delhi accelerate production of nuclear bombs makes no sense either.”
Even though the ambitious Indo – US nuclear deal signed in New Delhi on 2 March 2006 still needs the ratification from the US Congress, it however has marked the resumption of nuclear arms race in South Asia.
By granting India a nuclear status while at the same time depriving its archrival Pakistan, a natural ally of the US, President Bush has not only done damage to the treaty (the NPT), as has been raised by China. But he is also losing the confidence of one of his most important allies against terrorists, Pakistan.
India and Pakistan are neighbors and military archrivals that have fought each other repeatedly. Kargil war was the last war the two neighbors have fought. They have both developed nuclear weapons outside the nonproliferation treaty, which both refuse to sign. The new deal will remain to be seen as Bush’s diplomatic triumph or a resumption of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
Labels: indo-pak
blog by Mas Qisa'i at 12:56:00 AM
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